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CHAPTER FIVE
The Cape ofGoodHope and the
world economy, 1652-1835
Robert ROSS
In 1651, on the advice of two of their officers who had been shipwrecked
in Table Bay and had spent a year there, the Directors of the Dutch East
India Company (VOC) decided to found a small permanent station at
the Cape of Good Hope. In doing so they did not hope for commercial
gains in South Africa itself, and indeed the Cape station was run at a very
considerable loss throughout the 143 years of its existence. Rather, as
their instructions to their first commander, Jan van Riebeeck, made
plain, the Heren XVII saw the Cape as a refrwhmentstation and 'general
rendezvous' for the large fleets which they sent evety year from Europe
to the East. It was therefore essentiai that the ships find there 'the means
of procuring vegetables, meat, water and other needful refreshments and
by this means restore the health of their sick'.1 The settlement which
grew up around the VOC's station, later known as Cape Town, was thus
at first a port of call on the oceanic shipping routes, and this function it
long maintained, initially for the VOC exclusively and later for all ships
on the sea route between Europe and Asia.
The VOC establishment was generally able to fulfil many of its fleets'
requirements itself. The fort was sited at one of the few ppints on the
south-west coast where fresh water was always available, and the
Company controlled land alienation and irrigation rights. Vegetables for
the ships' crews were grown, largely by slaves, in the Companys gardens
in Table Valley. Firewood was cut from the Company^ closely guarded
preserves on the slopes of Table Mountain and later further inland by the
large force of slaves and European employees of the Company.2 The
dockyard, too, was manned by a combined slave and European
workforce.3 The hospital was not a wonder of medical efficiency, even by
the Standards of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it
probably provided better conditions for the sick - and certainly better
rations - than an East India ship would have done. Moreover, Cape
Town was undoubtedly far superior as a place for recuperation than a
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ship's'deck could be.4 Nevertheless, vety soon after Van Riebeeck
established the Cape station, it became clear that the VOC could not
itself profitably produce the bread and meat needed by the fleets, nor
could it achieve a sufficient supply of wine, which was necessary for the
sailors, both to keep them contented and as a preservable anti-scorbutic.
Nor could the VOC acquire what it needed by trade with the Khoikhoi.5
From 165% therefore, servants of the Company were encouraged to leave
its employment at Cape Town and to set up as farmers. It took thirty
years, and the extension of settlement beyond the slopes of Table
Mountain, before agriculture was sufficiently well established for the
cereal requirements of even the Company itself to be met. But, even
before 1700 Europeans had learned, in a somewhat rudimentary way,
how to exploit the virgin soils of the Cape, and further expansion of both
arable and pastoral activities was limited only by the necessity of
conquering the land and by the feasibility of establishing viable farms in
the territory so conquered.6
More or less simultaneously with the^first agricultural freeburghers,
men (and a few women) began to settle at the Cape to engage in a whole
range of other occupations. Most importantly, they became keepers of
drinking and lodging houses, serving the needs of the passing ships.
From the earliest days, though, they began to fulfil a much wider range
of.urban functions, as shopkeepers and general traders, as bakers and
brewers, as builders and carpenters, as smiths, coopers and potters and
even as silversmiths.7 With an increasingly large Company establishment,
Cape Town quickly grew into a modest town.
By around 1700, then, the economie basis for the colon/s continued
existence had been laid. The port, its town, and its agricultural and
pastoral hinterland had become firmly rooted; their existence was never
seriously threatened by attack from within the colony. Slaves had already
been imported in fair numbers as the basis for the Colonys labour force.
The first Africans, in this case Khoisan, had been at least semi-
proletarianised in European service. Nevertheless, the Cape Colony in
1700 was still minuscule. By the 1830s its population had risen from
around 2,000 to about 150,000,8 and stretched, no longer just to the
Berg river, but rather to the Orange and the upper Kei. Cape Town was
no longer a village of some 70 houses.9 It had grown to a town with more
than 1,500 dwellings, nearly 20,000 inhabitants and the füll range of
urban attributes.10 Moreover, although it was still by far the largest
settlement in the Cape, it was no longer the only one which could
reasonably be called a town. Stellenbosch, Paarl, Worcester, Genadendal,
Swellendam, Port Elizabeth, Graaff-Reinet and Grahamstown were all,
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at the very least, substantiaJ villages. Though by no means at the end of
its development, the coiony of the 1830s was close enough to maturity
for its settlers to begin to agitate for a Parlament.
In genend, historians have tended to consider this qualitative and
quantitative change as natura! and self-explanatory, and as puny in
comparison with the socio-economic revolution which followed on the
mineral discoveries of the late nineteenth Century. After all, such growth
was characteristic of colonies of white settlement and of slave societies -
and the Cape was both. Indeed, the Cape's success story was far less
spectacular than those of, for instance, British North America or the
West Indies. All the same, the economie history of the pre-industrial
Cape Coiony needs to be written in terms which are comparable to those,
of other colonies, concentrating on the increase of production, die, "'
development of export crops, and the establishment of Instruments of^lv'-c °!<'r
trade~äncTcommerce. These are the important issues in the economie" '"J':"3 v '"'"
history óf the Cape, rather than the much discussed trekboers, and the
alleged subsistence economy.11
The VOC and the economy
The position of the Dutch East India Company, as both governrnent and
commerical Company, had elements of contradiction. Obviously, the
main task of the high officials was to keep the costs of die Cape as low as ,.
possible, since there was never any hope that the station would make a "' ''
prof it for the VOC. At the same time, however, they had to develop the '~ 1
economy to fulfil the role set for it by the Heren XVII, namely the-"
victualling of the Company's ships and the supply of various products, -.'•''-'
above all wheat to Batavia. In addition, like all eighteendi Century
officials, whether of commercial companies or European governments,
diey saw no reason why they should not exploit dieir offices for personal
gain, the prohibitions of the Heren XVII notwithstanding. After die
dismissal of Governor Willem Adriaan van der Stel (see ch. 6, pp. 303—
07), officials could no longer engage directly in production, but they
retained privileged access to the import trade in particular.
The VOC had the legal right to impose monopolies over die sale of
goods from outside die Cape, over shipping and over the purchase of the
produce of Cape farms.* In the event, it did all of these things only in
* This last should more strictly be described as a monopsony.
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part. As regards the sale of Imports, the VOC had certain advantages,
which, however, feil far short of total control of the colon/s economie
life. The large number of ships that it sent annually from Europe to the
East invariably had a certain amount of unused cargo space, so that it
could import bulk, low-value goods, including iron and coal, without
transport costs; hence it dominated die trade in these items.12 It was also,
naturally, the sole importer of those goods whose production it
monopolised at source - the spices of the Moluccas, Banda, and Sri
Lanka, cloves, nutmeg, mace and cinnamon.13 In addition, it also tried
to enforce by ordinance a monopoly on tobacco imports in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and on coffee imports
towards the end of its mie.14 Nevertheless, the former monopoly died a
natural death, as die Company itself developed no great trade in tobacco,
which was not yet produced to any extent within the area of its charter.
:
 V '"'' Rather, the Company focussed increasingly on the importation of Asian
r\ G'U"1'" goods into Europe,15 but, even so, it made no attempt to acquire a
, / • • - - / 'i.. r p. monopoly in products such as Indian textiles, which did form a major
component of its imports to Europe. Thus as the number of non-Dutch
ships putting into Cape Town harbour increased in the latter half of the
eighteenth Century, the VOC's share of the importation to the Cape
apparently declined.
As to shipping, the VOC, even had it wished, could not have isolated
the Colony from the world's traffic putting into Cape Town harbour.
Even its most arbitrary measure along these lines, prohibiting the Cape
colonists from chartering or outfitting their own ships for the trade in
Eastern waters, probably had little effect on the colon/s economy;16
aftcr the prohibition was lifted in 1792, the colonists sent out only a few
ships.17 Even in the favourable conditions of the early nineteenth
Century, Cape-based international shipping got no further than working
the route between South Africa and Mauritius, Réunion and
Madagascar. In other cases it was generally more advantageous for
merchants to hire cargo space in ships which were sailing between
Europe and Asia.
. ^  > , • , Although it never monopolised the purchase of the colon/s wine,
< r. : ' wheat_and meat, the VOC considerably affected how these three main
, ! \ agricultural products were marketed. lts income from die retail sale of
~ ^ winewasoneofitsmainsourcesofrevenueattheCape. Aswasusualin
the Netherlands, each year the Company auctioned die franchise to seil
wine in Cape Town's taverns. The franchise holder or pachter thus gained
a strong, and sometimes excessive, grip on the wine market.18
However, the Company as such did not directly control the buying
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and selling of wine. Indeed, it could not even control the sales of the one
product in which it was particularly interested, namely wine from the x' • l ./
' twq Constantia estates, which had become one of the first 'chateau'( cvt c/\\
wines to receive recognition in Europe. The Company was able to seil
around ƒ 25,000's worth a year in Europe in the second half of the
eighteenth Century19, but it could only acquire the product on the basis
of its contracts with the Constantia owners. These_contracts wereuo.. W.ol<
regularly open for negotiation, both as regards price and quantity, and „%t\ (^ ^ ,
the owners were not required to seil exclusively to the VOC. Indeed they.
 x .. L,.,._, c
could use the presence of the VOC's competitors, notably the Danes and
the Swedes, to drive up the price.20 Rather than have the Company
monopolise the purchase of the wine, local officials of the VOC
preferred to use Constantia wine to attract foreigners to the Cape.21 '•
As the spie exporter of grain, the Company was the largest buyer from1; '•""'"'"'''j *•
the farmers. The price it set for its purchases remained constant for long ^cv' ' ''•••
periods, immune to annual fluctuations. This had the effect of ensuring
the farmers a guaranteed minimum price for their produce, on which
they could base their calculations. This was because the free market price
in Cape Town did not drop much below the VOC's figure even in years
of abundant harvests, but could rise well above it in years of scarcity,
despite the best efforts of the VOC and the Cape Town Burgerraad
(which in this represented the consumers) to hold it steady. Indeed the
sharp rise in the free market price during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War
of the 1780s forced the VOC, too, to buy wheat for nearly doublé the
sum it had paid previously.22
The meat market was more complicated. The VOC secured its own • l.A-Ce i
supplies by putting a_contract out to tender for five years, in general to \ y , .^ .
three people. These contractors acquired certain privileges, notably to
use the Companys shambles in Cape Town and the Groen Kloof farms
north of the city where the stock driven from the interior could
recuperate and put on weight before being slaughtered. However, by the
end of the Century, the VOC bought only a part of the colony's meat,
probably no more than a quarter, and there were alternative uses for
cattle in particular, notably as draught oxen and producers of butter. In
the face of these competing buyers, contracted butchers could not drive
down the purchase price and harm the Cape farmers.23 The VOC did
require all foreign ships visiting Cape Town to buy their meat from the
contracted butchers, who could charge the foreigners monopolistic
prices and so recoup the losses they suffered in their sales to the VOC.
Evidently, dien, the more foreign ships that put into Table Bay, the lower
the Company^ own expenses, and the local officials did what they could
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to foster these visits.24 On the other hand, the game could only be played
so far, since Cape Town could price itself out of the market of victualling
the fleets of Europe's other trading nations.25 In this, as in so many of its
activities, the Company could only seal off the colony to a very limited
extent from the world market.
Production • • •.
t - . - U t v < •-••f''-'",--''1'-'"'1''Since the Dutch East India Company was not an effectiye monopolist,
^the economy of the Cape Colony can be analysed, much as any other, by
'aiscussing the factors ofsupply and dernand.
The production leveïs of the various agricultural commodities has to
be estimated from the annual tax returns, known as the.j9ggaa/.
Unfortunately, these were subject to very considerable underrecording,
especially during the VOC period. This unreliability was least
pronounced in the case of wine production, because after 1744 the VOC
no longer taxed wine product ion on the basis of the opgaaf, but rather
charged/.741 for each barrel that entered Cape Town. This new impost
could not be evaded and was thus much more favourable to the VOC. It
also removed any motive to underreport wine production. As shown in
Figure 5.1, production rose rather regularly through the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. For instance, in 1725 1,133 leggers (about
660,000 litres) of wine were produced, in 1775, 5,528 (nearly 3-'/4
•'million litres) and in 1806, 9,643 leggers (over 5-V2 million). The only
major discontinuity was the sharpjrise jri^the 1820s, during the minor
boom caused by the temp~orary" preference given Cape wine on the
British market.2
It is far less easy to provide figures for grain production or for stock
holding, where underreporting was rife. For example, between the
'bpgaafs of 1795 and 1798 the colon/s wheat productiön is recorded as
i having increased by 419 per cent, its cattle herd by 351 per cent and its
sheep flock by 346 per cent - an unbelievable rate of growth. The
dramatic rise in figures was due to the farmers' fears after 1795 that the
new British government would punish evasion more severely than the
Company had done. Nevertheless, it is possible to make rough estimates
of the level of evasion for both grain and stock.27
t The two main units of currency in the Nctherlands and its empire were the guilder (ƒ)
wortli 20 stuivers and the rijksdaalder (rixdoliar) worth 48. In 1795 the rixdollar was wotth
£0.20 sterling.
The Cape and the world economy, 1652 -1835 249
170
 n
160
150.
140.
130
120
110-
100
90
80-
70
60-
50-
40
30-
20.
10-
1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840
Figure 5.1 Wine production in 1700-1839. (In thousands of leggers)
Source: Van Duin and Ross, Economy and ROSS, 'Relative importance'.
N.B. l legger js equivalent to 582 litres.
The reconstructed development of wheat production is outlined in
Figure 5.2. As with wine, it shows the steady rise in production levels
throughout the period; from perhaps 15,000 hectolitres in the 1720s to
over 50,000 by the 1770s and over 130,000 by 1806. There was only one
decade, the 1740s, when production seemed temporarily to be running
ahead of consumption, but this was shortly solved by a combination of
inferior harvests and an increase in the foreign shipping in Table Bay,
because of the outbreak of war.28 Later, from the 1780s on, the danger
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Kgure 5.2 Wheat production, 1700-1839. (In thousands of hectolitres)
Source: Van Duin and Ross, Ectmvmy and ROSS, 'Relative importance'.
N.B. Until 1800, the figures are based on the reconstructions proposed in
Van Duin and Ross, Economy; the figures for 1795-1804 are missing, or at
least exist in such small numbers that they are not included in this graph.
was that the Cape would be short of grain - and on one occasion k even
had to import one million pounds from the United States to avert a
• potential shortfall.29 This was probably because die Cape's poor roads
restricted the economie cultivation of grain to those areas from where
the market could be reached without crossing a major mountain pass.
Only toward the end of the eighteenth Century were any attempts made
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Figure 5.3 Cattle numbers, 1700-1839. (In thousands)
Source: Van Duin and Ross, Economy, and Ross, 'Relative importance1.
N.B. Until 1795, the figures are reconstructions. The maximum figure
gn en assumes that one-quarter of the true valuc was recorded in the opgaaf,
the minimum figure given assumes that onc-third of the true value was
recorded.
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Figure 5.4 Sheep numbets, 1700-1839. (In thousands)
Source*. Van Duin and Ross, Economy and Ross, 'Relative importance'.
N.B. Until 1795, the figures are reconstructions. The maximum figure
given assumes that only one-quartcr of the true value was recorded in the
opgaaf, the minimum figure given assumes that one-third of the true value
was recorded.
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to extend the area of potential arable land by developing coastal
shipping. The initial experiment, in the Mossel Bay area in the 1780s,
failed because of a temporary decline in die market following the end of
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.30 After die British take-over, this project
was revitalised and the plains from Caledon to Mossel Bay, and also
around St. Helena Bay to the north, became growing centres for grain
production.31
In Figures 5.3 and 5.4 the reconstructed totals for the colonial cattle V ..L >
herd and sheep flock are given. In the 1720s the colony had rather more .
thän25ü;öT)T)"sFeeparidratherunder 100,000cattle. In the 1770s there
were more than a million sheep and around 250,000 cattle, and the' r< l!lc"'"1
numbers continued to grow thereafter, to over 1-3A million sheep and^r' <-,--U-j
over 300,000 cattle by the 1820s. This was of course the result of the
steady trekboer expansion into the Cape's interior, which was conquered
from the Khoisan and later the Xliosa. Although the most distant
trekboers were initially not as closely tied to the market as the farmers of
the southwestern Cape, in time the butchers would make their presence
feit in each successive region, usually within a few years' of its initial
settlement by whites. In the early years, and in the western Karoo until
deep in the nineteenth Century,32 the butchers drove the stock to Cape
Town on the hoof. For this reason, Cape hairy sheep, which keep their
weight well under such conditions, were for a long time raised in
preference to European sheep in such areas. Nevertheless the
establishment of small harbours along the southern coast, and especially
of Port Elizabeth, was to reorient much of the livestock trade and to
provide for the first time a satisfactory outlet for the hides, horns and
skins that were previously a discarded by-product of the stock industry.
These outlets would then provide the commercial basis for the shift to
wool productipn in the eastern Cape, which was just getting under way
in 1835 and which in die later nineteenth Century would lead raJBort
Elizabeth becoming the most dynamic financial and commercial centre
in the Cape.33 It had begun earlier in a few areas of the better capitalised
west, but even there, serious expansion had to wait for the importation
of the first merino sheep, which unlike the Dutch animals with which the
VOC had made a few abortive attempts, were suited to the arid
environment of the Cape Colony.34 ,., <:. •„. • •,
The steady expansion of all sectors of the agriculniral economy during . >. • • . • >
th.L-£!£ii?.!£?2th_fln?' nineteenth centuries demonstrates that South
 ( ^ ^
African farmers' actions were not limited by anything other than the
 f . ^
availability of capita! and markets. When new transport facilities or new., '
markets opened, they responded quickly, at least when they could raisej
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the capital required. Their expansion, particularly of arabic crops, was
deterniined by the possibilities they saw of selling their produce,
however imperfect these forecasts may have been. In other words, their
actions can be explained more in terms of economie rationality, than in
< c> foJrw'MiVOff J terms of Afrikaner 'cultural lag',35 or other-theories which would see
,
 y t Jc.i.Vï, i their economie behaviour as irrational 'overproduction.' Had there
~-
f v
 J really been chronic 'overproduction' at the Cape, as some historians have
argued, there would necessarily have been a decline in prices and
widespread bankruptcies among farmers. Neither in fact occurred - at
least not until the 1820s when the market for Cape wine contracted
sharply with the abolition of preferential tariffs on the British market.36
The market for Cape products
•«l rf_^ _ • ex/' •(" ' c
c t,* cyrctl ' "VlA The steady growth of production was a response to a continual increase
injiie_size_ofthejiiarket for agricultural products, both at the Cape and
overseas. Notwithstanding the intermittent complaints of the farmers,
which have led historians to believe that they generally produced more
than they could seil, in fact normally Cape agricultural produce found a
ready market. Exports never played the predominant role that they did in
the frequently export-led economies of the New World. With the
exception of elephant hunting, which contributed considerably to the
colonists' knowledge of the Cape's interior but little to the economy as
<-» ' r r a whole, there was no sector which produced exclusiyely, or even
w v ^rfpredominantly, for. the overseas.market. The early exports consisted
largely of wheat to the Asian factories (trading sites) of the VOC, where
j it was made into bread for European traders, and also of butler and
i ' - wine.37 For a time in the 1770s, too, Cape wheat production was
sufficient to allow considerable shipments to Amsterdam, to compete
> with Polish grain.38 Nevertheless, this trade did not produce such great
profits, either for the VOC or for the Cape grain farmers, that the Cape
wheat production expanded explosively. A series of bad harvests,
coupled with the growth of die local market during the Fourth Anglo-
Dutch War of the 1780s, curtailed the trade to Europe. Thereafter, grain
production was never again sufficient for more than a trickle of exports,
, ,
 M although it expanded sufficiently to keep abreast of local demand.39
* • ' *
 l
 Wine exports, particularly to Europe, were at a much lower level
during the eighteenth Century because Cape wines - the Constantia
'7 ' l vintages excepted - were too inferior_or tqq expensive to find large
markets overseas. After the British conquest, by contrast, a new market
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opened up in England, as a result of imperial preferential tariffs. A very
considerable increase in production resulted, until the abolition of the
tariff advantages ended the boom. Substitute markets were found after
1830, largely in Australia and South America, but they were insufficient
to absorb the temporaty glut. A large number of bankruptcies ensued
among wine farmers in this single, rather mild, example at the Cape of
die boom-and-bust pattern so characteristic of slave economies
everywhere.40
In the days before refrigeration,_direct^ export of livestock productsw 1
was necessarily limited However, some tafiow was sent to Europe, ancf™1'
salted Cape butter was sent to Batavia,41 while the early commercial
development of what was to become Port Elizabeth was based on the
salting of meat for Mauritius.42. Surprisingly, there is no indication of
eighteenth-century export of hides, which later became important in the
mid-nineteenth Century. Wool exportsjwere beginning in the 1820s and ^  <*
1830s, a period which saw the acclimatisation of merino sheep to South •.*
African conditions and the heyday of the colon/s largest sheep estate
 ( v
ownedby Van Breda, Reitz, Joubert and Co. near Cape Agulhas;43 wool
did not, however, become a major export.until .the 1840s. '
In all cases, except perhaps that of wine product ion during the early
nineteenth Century, the local market considerably exceeded fbreign^v
markets as an outlet for die Cape's agricultural produce./This can be
demonstrated by comparing the amounts brought into Cape Town, or
the amounts said to be required by the urban population, with the
quantities sent overseas.44 These figures are not always available before
die late eighteenth Century, but on die reasonable assumption that the
consumption patterns of Capetonians and visiting ships did not change
drastically over the eighteenth Century, a sufficiently accurate
reconstruction can be made of die earlier period to support dlis
conclusion.45 It must be noted, however, diät Cape Town did not s
comprise the entire local market for wine and grains. There was also a
regulär exchange of produce between the wheat and wine farms.
Stock production was, by contrast, somewhat less oriented to the,;
market. A considerable proportion of the natural increase of herds and,
flocks was used by farmers bodi to build up viable breeding stocks and
for fheir own needs. They also sold stock to die agrarian districts which
needed only meat and, more importantly, draft oxen, which were
frequently in short supply and without which crops could not have been
grown, harvested, or transported to town.46 In the late eighteend)
Century only about three to five per cent of die colony's cattle and sheep
was butchered annually in Cape Town. This seemingly meagre figure
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obviously does not represent the totality of the pastoralists' involvement
with the market. Virtually all farmers maintained links of varying
strengths with the Cape Town market and responded to the pressures
which emanated from k. These pressures became steadily greater as, in
any given district, European settlement became more firmly established.
Moreover, from the beginning, k was often the most active of the
colony's entrepreneurs who invested in the opening up of even the most
,j distant areas of the colony; their goals were to supply their own farms
', wkhj3xeri,_tp ensure deliveries of meat to the Cape market and, later to
pioneer wopl production. In this they operated alongside those who,
went to the frontier because they hoped to build up a good estate on the
basis of relatively little capita!.47
Imports
' } '""•' 'Before 1807 the most important imports of the Cape Colony were slayes,
' "* •-
 l
- ' Jy'th0111 whom the economy could not have functioned. The total must .
have been several tens of thousands, spread over the 155 years of the
traffic. Wliile the VOC organised a fair number of expeditions to
.'- provide slaves for its own use, much of the trade was privately organised,
with slaves imported in small numbers, ekher as part of the illegal, but
tolerated, perquiskes of VOC sailors and officers or off-loaded from the
'
 s
 ' ' ' ' slavers rounding the Cape of Good Hope en route from Madagascar or
Mozambique to the Americas48 (see ch. 3, pp. 112- 19) .
The remaining imports to the Cape comprised_cpttpn and other
textiles, largely from India; a whole range of consumer goods, led by
trbpkal products such as coffee, tea, sugar and spices but evenrually
including a wide range of European manufactures as the white Cape
community became more established and its tastes more developed; and
finally, agricultural and other implements and materials, such as iron, for
fabricating them. Significantly, the import business of the Van Reenen
, „ . . .family during the 1780s, then die most diversified, enterprising and
successfbl entrepreneurs in the colony, centred on the import of
agricultural tools.49
As was pointed out above, the VOC did not attempt to impose a
monopoly over imports to the colony, except_for spices, coffee and,
ineffectually, sugar. Other goods were imported quite legally, both from
Europe and the East, either by individual sailors using space allowed to
them on VOC ships,50 or by foreigners. Nor did the VOC levy duties on
these imports, this being a personal perquisite of the fiscaal. As a result,
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we do not have ligures on imports, except for those goods sold by the „ , „i j.
VOC, which, in all probability, formed a relatively small proportion of ^ ^ '( r
total imports. Some indication of the level of private trading can be ^
gathered from the guantitiejij^rnoney^that individuals transferred to
Europe via the VOC to pay_fo£ imports. Such transfers ran at about
ƒ.425,000 per annum in "thT"Ï750s, rising to ƒ600,000 by the late
1780s.51 After the arrival of the British, exact figuresjbr imports were ^ t 'U^ ,* r', v(t ;
produced. During the First British Occupation (1795-1802), they i> .< ' '.l 0>-
amounted to on average £280,000 (or 1,120,000 rixdollars) per year.uu- ,,^. -,
Information is again unavailable during the Batavian period, but after
1806, until the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, imports werejow, i
consistently under £ 100,000 annually. Since this was also a time of high • ^  Jc 'c
military expenditure in Cape Town diere was probably a build-up of cash ' , v ' ' >.
in the colony, so that, as trade became easier after 1813, the annual value . >. j „C 1 (
of imports grew quickly, and only dropped below £ 300,000 four times l c» ' < f i * >
before 1835, when they stood at an all-time high of £534,000 per
annum.
The pattern of exports paralleled that of imports, though consistently l < f-'
at a much lower level. For the VOC period precise figures are not
available, but nevertheless the speed with which silver coinage drained
out of the colony would seem to indicate a very considerable excess of
imports over exports.52 During the Napoleonic wars, exports were ,
 ; ,
almost always under £100,000 a year, but after 1813 they rose steadilyto
reach a value of £370,000 in 1834. Of these exports, a proportion ' ' '
ranging between 92 per cent (in 1824) and 77 per cent (in 1822) were of > ' ' '
Cape products, die rest being re-exports from Asia and Europe, mainly' " ' '
to Mauritius and Réunion.53 Thus the balance ofjCape. trade was
conspicuously negative. Between Ï8Ö7 and 1835, when there are i
definite figures, there were only three years in which exports exceeded '
imports and indeed die deficit was offen larger than the volume of' l '''
exports itself. In part this deficit would have been counterbalanced by' " •} <, l' }
such invisible exports as the victualling of ships in the harbour, but this, > - , , \ '\. -.'
activity would not have been nearly adequate to achieve anything
 ( , » ( , \ \
approaching a balance of payments.
Nevertheless, the colon/s trade imbalance was somewhat rectified
over the long term by the transfers of money, first from the Netherlands
and dien from Great Britain, for the government administration, the
army and the navy. Clearly Cape agriculture was kept in business, and its
economy allowed to expand, even during the wine and wool export
booms, above all by die absorptive qualities of the military and
governmental sectors of the colonys economy. WS. van Ryneveld was
258 The Cape economy
quite correct to see the commercial prosperity of the Cape as dependent
on the size of its garrison,54 and indeed the economy's growth in die first
half of die nineteenth Century was largely f inanced by British military
remittances.55
^
 av Recognition of die importance gf_die_Cage^_JntCTnd_.mjdket_fbr
agncultural producers is npnethejess;_a recognitipn of the strengdi of the
economy's links to the world economy. The ships and die garrisons were
notTönly vëry considerable consumers in their own right but also they
provided the opportunities on which the non-rural population of the
f
-
e
 P colony could subsist. The income they generaled was spent within the
f (•-•> colony and thus led to the creation of more income. * Large proportions
'^  of die non-agrarian population of the colony were either the direct agents
*
 u
 first of the Dutch East India Company and later of the British state, or
acquired their living by providing them widi services, though naturally
the rural economie growth also brought into being numerous merchants
and artisans, who in their own turn became consumers of bread, meat
and wine. In this way the effect of the world economy penetrated far
deeper into Cape society than might appear from an analysis of direct
purchases by outsiders.
Currency, credit anA banking
As we have seen, the Cape's economy increasingly became
commercialised .^.?L..hence___dependent_ _pn jnoney and credit
" arrangements. In the eighteenth Century, such facilities were informal
;
" but by no means absent. The Cape was linked to the monetary System of
the Dutch Empire and the Indian Ocean. As a result, a large variety of
coins were in circulation, all in silyer, and hence all easily convertible.
The Spanish reals (or pieces-of-eight) were the most populär, because
their puriry was most trusted, Spanish America being the greatest source
of the world's silver. The Companys annual shipments of coin to the
Cape, which provided a large proportion of the Cape's money, therefore
always contained a certain number of reals, although increasingly the
Company attempted to replace them with Dutch guilders, to keep the
profits from minting coin in the Dutch Republic.56 The British too,
found it necessary to pay their troops in Spanish dollars.57
^ This is of course the multiplier effect of economie theory. For a useful exposition, see
G.R. Hawke, EcmomicsforHistmians (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 63-74.
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', Credit arrangements in the eighteenth Century were also largely ^"l1-'
informal. IndivSduaïs with capital lent it out, particularly to those
• beginning an agricultural enterprise, generally at 5 per cent interest.
i Many of the creditors were the Company officials, who had better
j opportunities than freeburghers to accumulate weahh and fewer avenues
| for investment, since they were forbidden to directly engage in
i agriculture.58 Thus, at his death in 1761, Joachim von Dessin, longtime
i head of the Orphan Chamber and founder of the South African Library,
held ƒ 25,919 in interest- bearing loans made to 33 different people,
many of them farmers.59
 u>~, .
A number of burghers also engaged in lending, and it seems that some
of them retired from farm ownership to become rentiers at the end of " f I V A ^
their life.60 In addition, thejunds of the church were used to provide • ^ °vj
mortgages61 and the Wees- enBoedelkamer (thejDrphan Chamber) acted as - -f r'
a fairly large-scale provider of credit, since it administered the estates of
those who died without heirs in South Africa, at least until the heirs
could be found. Since there were many single, uprooted men in the
service of the VOC, this fund could grow rapidly. In 1720 it stood at over
200,000 rixdollars; by 1780 it had risen to nearly 400,000, in 1800 to
over a million and by 1830 to just about three million (admittedly
devalued) rixdollars.62
The Orphan Chamber and the _church_ were involved largely in 'c ^^
finahcingJongiterrrurnortgages. There was also a need for short-term
commercial credit, to enable tradespeople to pay for their wholesale , ,
purchases before they could resell them. This need was fuif illed in part by
private lenders, but even more by the licensed auctioneers. Public sales, \, < ,
for instance of imported goods, were controlled by these people, and . ,
they were assured of first claim on the assets of any of their creditors who
went bankrupt. As a result, they were willing to provide credit to the / '
 c' , ,
purchasers of goods at auctions, to which they were empowered to admit
only merchants whose credit they trusted. They were also allowed to
charge the high interest rate of 10 per cent.63
Between 1782 and 1808, considerable changes occurred in all these »
matters. First, the metallic basis of the currency was abandoned . In 1782, s ) '
confronted with a disruption of silver supplies during the FourthAnglo- * ;
Dutch War (1780— 84), the Cape government found it necessary to issue
money on stamped parchment, in denominations running from an
eighth of a rixdoÜar (six stuivers) to sixty rixdollars. The proclamation of
the new currency was accompanied by a promise that it would be
redeemed by the Company, when sufficient hard money became
available, and by a strict prohibition on the export of precious metal
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from the colony.64 The latter provision proved a complete dead letter,
and the inconvettability of the Cape currency led to an increased
haemorrhage of silver from the colony.8 On the odier hand, the
Company did honour its commitment to buy back the notes it had
issued,65 redeeming most of them until the shortage of currency at the
Cape again became acute in 1792 and paper money once again had to be
issued. Thus by the time the British first captured the Cape in 1795,
there was a total of 1,291,276 rixdollars and 42 stuivers in paper money
in circulation.66
Thereafter, paper currency was employed in the Cape until 1825,
theoretically backed by government land and buildings, not by silver.67
Therefore, the steady drain of metallic currency from the colony
continued, ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding.68 At the same
time, the buying power of the rixdollar fluctuated considerably,
although the trend was steadily downwards. Thus by 1803, it stood at 30
per cent below its original value of 4 British Shillings11 and with the
outbreak of war in 1805 it declined very sharply, since the opportunities
for money transfers to the Netherlands were few.69 After regaining par
value in 1806, it devalued steadily until by 1821 it was worth only about
one shilling and six pence, or three-eighths of its face value.70
In 1825, the British Treasury decided that all the currencies of the
Empire, including rixdollars, should be made dependent on sterling. The
estimated 3,108,000 rixdollars then in circulation were thus to be made
convertible jntp_sterling at a fixed (no longer a floating) rate of one
shilling and sixpence each, minus a small premium which was reckbned
to cover the costs of transporting British coins to South Africa. As a
result, die rixdollar slowly faded out of existence, being replaced by
British coinage and promissory notes, until on 31 March 1841 it ceased
to be legal tender.71 The measure, which was in effect devaluation, led to
vigorous protes.ts in the Cape Colony. A petition signed by 2,115 people
was sent to London requesting that the ordinance be rescinded, and
their representations were supported by a group of leading merchants
and by the board of the Orphan Chamber. The Orphan Masters argued
that capitalists would pass on their losses by raising rents and interest
rates, causing suffering among debtors, tenants, and in general, the
colony's poor.72 In the event, the devaluation caused considerable losses
to those who had borrowed money in sterling to invest in South Africa
and who thus needed many more rixdollars to repay their loans.73
SThis is a classic exampjc of the workings of Greshani's Law, which states that bad money
always drives out good.
fl Until 1970 there were 20 Shillings, each consisting of twelve pcncc, to the pound.
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Nevertheless, the effect on the Cape's economy as a whole seems to have
been minor, since the colony's inhabitants had long talcen account of the
diminished value of the rixdollar in their transactions.74
It was a matter of considerable contemporary controversy why the •
rixdollar devalued so fast.75 John Trotter, commissioned by the Cape
Chamber of Commerce to investigate the matter, argued that the
negative balance of payments was to blame, but his reasoning was
attacked by P.W Grant, his superior in the Indian revenue service. Inrrr'-' -•
general Grant's position has been supported by later investigators. Grant - , , , _ . , ,
claimed that the excessive issues of money had driven down die value of
die rixdollar. The increase in the Cape's money supply, with its unwantedcw>'""'
devaluatory consequences, derived from the government's financing9&1*"'
public works by printing more money, but also, and probably above all,
by its repeated augmentation of the capital of the government-owned
Bank van Lening (knownafter 1795 as the Loanor Lombard Bank).76 (r.jï v-
„The Loan_Bank_ was set up by the Commissioners-General/
Nederburgh and Frijkenius in 1793.77 Their stated motive was to stem
the haemorrhage of specie out of the colony, but the effect of their r i " < <" •
actions, which they probably foresaw, was to give the government a very
substantial stake in the lucrative credit business. The Bank did not accept
deposits, but radier functioned as a combination of mortgage Institution
and pawn-broker, lending money against the security of fixed property
and valuables, such as precious metal and jewellery. In 1822, however, it
began to accept small deposits, but not at a rate of interest likely to attract
large sums of capital. The great proportion of its capital was provided by
the government, and this was augmented in 1802 by another 165,000
rixdollars, and rose steadily over two million rixdollars.78 The
government profited from interest on the money it loaned to the Bank,
which, less the costs, amounted to 25,000 rixdollars in the 1790s rising
to over 90,000 rixdollars in 1824.79
In addition to the Lombard Bank, a Discount Bank was set up at die
Cape in 1808. Thetwo institutions were closely linked, and had the same
chairman, but their functions were clearly distinct. The directors of the
bank hoped to put an end to the practice whereby money lent on the
security of real estate was re-lent at a higher rate of interest to those who
required short-term credit.80 Therefore the Discount Bank provided
short-term loans,81 but it also solicited deposits from Cape Town's
inhabitants. Although after 1814 it no longer provided interest on such
money, die convenience die bank provided for mercantile transactions
induced many people to make deposits. Some depositors wished to
remain in good standing widi the bank, which was frequently forced to
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refuse its loan services to the public for want of funds.82 At any event, by
1824 there were 214 accounts at the bank, with a total of more than one
and a half million rixdoilars.83 Of these, 29 were said to belong to
Government officials, two to the English East India Company, 34 to
merchants and the rest to 'tradesmen and other individuals'. Clearly the
Discount Bank had penetrated fairly well into Cape Town's commercial
Community.
Injjeneral, di£_rwo_g^>verninerit banks did not run great risks by
providing cre3it to the merchants. In a small community like Cape Tbwn,
accurate Information was available on the financial position of all
merchants. In 1812 the president of die two banks commented that no
one was astonished when a merchant went bankrupt, because his affairs
were perfectly known in advance.84 His attitude may have hastened the
merchant's bankruptcy, but k was certainly a sufficient defence for the
financial institutions. The banks were perhaps somewhat less
conservative in their dealings with the farmers, and the Lombard bank
was badly hit in the late 1820s after the crisis in the wine industry caused
a fall in the value of agricultural property.85
At first diese banking and credit arrangements were limited to Cape
Town and its immediate environs (although of course the mortgages on
agricultural property spread further up country). It would not have been
possible, declared the president of the Discount Bank as late as 1825, to
provide the same services in Graaff-Reinet or Grahamstown.86 Indeed,
the great bulk of the colon/s currency also remained in the
southwestern Cape. This fact does not indicate a lack of
commercialisation amongst eastern farmers, who were certainly
concerned with the state of the currency, and indeed petitioned against
the introduction of paper money immediately on its introduction.87
Moreover, an alternative form of money (and for that matter of
commercial credit) came into existence in the east, namely the so-called
slc$ieR..briejje$, which were promissory notes issued by the travelling
• Tsutchers.88 These performed the function of a circulating medium in the
country districts but could be cashed only in Cape Town, either by a
farmer during his regulär but infrequent visits there or, probably
increasingly, by the smousen, or travelling pedlars. Consequently, the
bankruptcy of a major butcher would have widespread repercussions
deep into the platteland, as those caught with his briefjes might not be
able to meet their obligations.89
Credit provided by farmers to butchers was not die only form of
private lending after the founding of the Loan and Discount banks. A
goodly proportion of the credit market continued to operate outside the
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aegis of the government banking system, which could not meet the
demands made on it, simply for lack of funds. As the colon/s economy .
expanded in the first third of the nineteenth Century, it was natural that
attempts, should be made to set up private banks, but nevertheless the
government blocked the first attempt, by J.B. Ebden in 1826, largely in
order to safeguard the revenue it acquired from the state institutions.90
Such a policy, however, could not last in the laissez-faire climate of the
nineteenth Century. Pressure for the establishment of a private banking
system grew sharply, with the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, for
instance, attributing the bankruptcy of several of its members to
temporary cash-flow problems which the Discount Bank could not
alleviate.91 As a result, the first private Cape bank was founded in 183/5
die joint stock Cape of Good Hope Bank, and it was rapidly followed by
many others, not merely in Cape Town but also in the interior of the
colony. In 1843, the government banks abandoned their normal banking
operations and became mere adjuncts of the colonial treasury.92
The structure ofcommerce
Although almost from the beginning of the colony's history a number of
colonists had engaged in die import trade, particularly in slaves,93 only
in the last third of the eighteenth Century did large-scale merchants begin
to acquire the leading positions they would maintain throughout die
pre-industrial period. Previously, the richest burghers had acquired dieir
wealth dirough farming, butchering, large-scale fishing, exploiting of
liquor franchises, and supplying building materials.94 By the 1770s,
diough, major import houses first emerged of the type that would be Q
characteristic later. The first two were La Fèbre and Co. and Cruywagen "
and Co., both consortia headed by Company officials. These companies \j
were to be among the major targets of the Cape Patriots' complaints (see
ch. 6, pp. 309—15). This was not surprising since they were the major
competitors of certain leading Patriots, notably the Van Reenens, and '<
enjoyed what were seen as unfair advantages, such as prior access to
incoming ships, first claim on the transfer of money to the Netherlands
and preference in acquiring cargo space in the VOC ships.95 The last
service was arranged by their agents in Holland, who contracted VOC
sailors to fill their sea-chests with the goods ordered by the Cape
merchants.96 Perhaps as a result of the Patriot agitation, the partnerships
of Cruywagen and Co. and La Fèbre and Co. seemingly lost importance
after 1780 and faded out of existence, although a number of participants
remained important Capejnisinessrnen.97 ^c ^  v,, i \_ v..
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,
Aböut the same time, the economie boom at the Cape during the
a , CA ppurth Angto:Dutcri War (1780-84) stimuïated the development of
-, private mercantiïe activity, as can be seen most clearly in the activities of
j the Van Reenen farnily. Previously engaged in importation, they decided
^ ** '"'' in Ï78Tto rë^nter this business, reckoning both on the discomforture of
W c) i l the officials as a result of Patriot agitation, and on the improvement of
economie conditions which would result from the Anglo-Dutch War,
( c A u r (• < - Vd tne consequent presence of a large French force at tlie Cape. The
development of their business was made easier by the presence of
Jacobus van Reenen in the Patriot delegation that had gone to the
Netherlands in 1779. Unfortunately, however, relations between Jacobus
and his son Johannes Gysbertus, in charge of the Cape Town Operation,
became strained and led to a major court case between them.98 The
younger Van Reenen was almost certainly the major importer to the
Cape in the 1780s. In three years, his father spent/136,252 on his behalf
buying goods in Europe and sending them to die Cape. Apparently
these imports yielded a reasonable profit for his son." After 1784,
details even of the younger Van Reenen's activities are missing, except for
occasional glimpses, such as the bill of lading for about ƒ 30,000 worth
of ironware (largely agricultural implements), wine, hops and clothing
that hè had shipped to the Cape via Jan and Willem Willink of
Amsterdam in 1787100 On the activities of other merchants, nothing is
yet known.
In 1792, the Commissioners-General Nederburgh and Frijkenius
simultaneously tightened up payment of freight charges and import
duties on goods sent to the Cape in Company ships and, for the first
time, allowed Cape burghers to own their own ships and to import
almost all goods both from Europe and from Asia.101 In the first years
: after 1792, probably in part as a result of the outbreak of the French
Revolutionary Wars, the Cape was temporarily starved of imported
goods. When the British took over in 1795, J.F. Kirsten wrote that 'at
present the inhabitants are in great want of Iron, which is not to be
procured for money, as well of Cloath, Coals, Timber etc.'.102 The
problem was so great that the British were forced to suspend the
Navigation Acts with respect to the Cape, an unprecedented step in their
imperial history, and numerous American, Danish and Swedish ships
arrived in Cape Town.103 Neverthelcss the shortage of imported goods
was so desperate that Henry Dundas, Secretary for War and Colonies,
had to prevail upon a London trader to send a consignment of
agricultural equipment to the Cape in 1798.1(l4
During the period of the First British Occupation and the Batavian
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OJ
Republic, the conditions of war and uncertainty about the future
 r
discouraged tfië'ëstabTishment of a settled merchant class. Considerable
pTöfïts were made, both in the slave trade and in other activities, but the
dealings were in general somewhat shady. The most successful
individual, Michael Hogan, found it expedient to depart to the United
States with his profits after a few years in Cape Town.105 In addition,
ünder the British, the East India Company attempted to impose a
monopoly on the importation of Asiatic goods to the Cape.106
Nevertheless, very considefable quantities of goods were imported
during the First British Occupation, nearly six million rixdollars worth
during the four years 1799-1802, excluding smuggled goods.107 Of
these 28 per cent came from the East, the rest from Europe and America.
The majority of goods came in English ships. However, both these
goods and those that came in American, Danish and Swedish ships were
sent by overseas speculators, not on the order of Cape merchants. ,
In the Batavian period ( 1803—06) trade suffered as a consequence of '
war. Goods were up to four times as expensive at the Cape as in thé
Netherlands, a reflection ofthe difficulties of transport.108 Nevertheless,
Commissioner-General J.A. de Mist developed plans in this period to .
turn the Cape into a staple port where Asiatic goods could be stored and ( <
resold to European merchants who would thus not have to journey all '
the way to India or die East Indies archipelago. However, the Dutch
government had made no decision on how to re-organise the economics
of its colonial empire - the VOC had collapsed in 1795 - when die
British reoccupied the Cape in 1806.109
In the Second British Occupation, the channels of commerce had to •
be re-established. In 1812, the president of the Bank commented that
there were no more than half a dozen merchants in the colony who
imported from England.110 These would almost certainly not have
included members ofthe old VOC commercial elite, and it has therefore
been süpposed rhat the new merchants were all British traders with
better access to British business circles than their Dutch predecessors and
competitors.111 This is only partially true. For instance, Constant van
Nuldt Onkruijdt, who had been landdrost of Swellendam under the
VOC, was nevertheless President of the Cape Town Chamber of
Commerce in 1808. 112 To succeed in commerce at the Cape in the early
years of British rule, one needed, not just sufficient capital, acunien and
good fortune, but also the ability to straddle the worlds of old and new
Cape Town. Significantly, several of the most successful British
merchants married into established Cape families, notably Hamilton
Ross (a former British army officer who was fluent in Dutch by his
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death),J.B. Ebden and, somewhat later, all three of the partners in the
firm of Barry and Nephews, who all married Van Reenens.113
During these early years Ebden and Ross established their positions as
two of Cape Town's leading merchants, which they were to hold until
mid-century. Their activities included not only importation to the Cape,
but also provisioning Réunion and Mauritius, where the Cape had been
a major supplier since the 1770s.114 At the same time they and other
merchants had to contend with the monopoly on Eastern goods
jealously guarded by the English East India Company.115 Nevertheless,
even after the Company's charter was revised in 1813, reducing its
monopoly privileges effectively only to tea,116 the position of Cape
Town's merchant community remained parlous. There were numerous
bankruptcies among the British settlers in the town.117 Only in the
, 1820s, despite the abolition of the preferential tariff for Cape wine, did
matters improve, perhaps because of the establishment in London of the
Cape of Good Hope Trade Society and the foundation of firms there
spèclfically concefnëcT wTth Capë"tïaaê7"hotably Abraham Borrodaile
J;and Co.118
This stabilisation can be seen not just among the major merchants and
mercantile houses but more generally in the structure of the colony's
distribution and retail system, both in Cape Town and in the
countryside. In the eighteenth Century, it was generally reported that
every householder in Cape Town was a merchant, either füll or part-
time.119 The irregularity with which commodities arrived at the Cape led
to rapid price shifts and thus encouraged speculation, which was
; particularly rife at the auctions.120 Only by putting a heavy mark-up on
the goods acquired at such sales before they were sold to rural customers,
could traders protect themselves against the losses inherent in this
system. There was little to encourage merchants to specialise in a
particular line of goods, As Edward Hanbury noted as late as 1819, 'In
this place ship chandlers and storekeepers deal in anything'. To get the
business of die shops, Hanbury had to keep 'a general store of goods
calculated to retail to the town as well', a combination which was
eventually to lead to his bankruptcy.121 By the 1820s, general merchants
and chandlers continued to do business in Cape Town, but there was a
steady move towards specialisation: business was no longer conducted
from private houses, and there was a steady trend towards the
establishment of definite shops, albeit without shopwindows for the
display of goods.122
i The sale of fpodstuffs was organised in a number of ways. The retailing
of wine was closely contracted and there were also licensing Systems for
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butchers and bakers. However, the retail sale of cakes and biscuits, fish,
fruits and vegetables was largely in the hands of die slaves.123 Initially,
retailing by slaves had been organised by the owners of the bakeries, the
market gardens in Table Valley and, perhaps, the fishing smacks, but
increasingly the slaves themselves came to act as petty entrepreneurs, ,•
agreeing to turn over a fixed sum to their master or mistress at the end
of the week. If they failed, they risked a flogging, especially as it was
believed (generally erroneously) that slave entrepreneurs gambled their
proceeds away.124 A few of die successful slaves .were able to use this
System to build up their own capital, and thus to purchase their own
emancipation. For this reason, diere were considerable numbers of fruit-
sellers and small retailers among the Free Blacks, who also owned Cape
Town's f irst 'chop-houses' or cheap restaurants, usually in the vicinity of
theharbour.125
In the country districts a similar process of specialisation occurred,
although the continuing expansion of die colony meant that it had to be ' '
repeated regularly in district after district. The f irst persons who
commercially penetrated a given district were the smousen. As early as
1774, die Council of Policy had reason to complain of those persons who
'for some time back . . . have made it their business to wander about
everywhere in the Interior, from one District to another, with goods and
merchandise, conveyed on wagons, horses or pack oxen, thus causing
many irregularities in the said districts.'126 Therefore it decided to forbid
diis trade, which was being practiced not only among die European
settlers but also already among the Xhosa. Neverdieless, this prohibition
was neither observed nor enforced, probably in part because Cape Town
merchants, including officials, were already providing the financial
backing for such trading trips.127 From dien on, until at least die 1930s,
these travelling smousen were a regulär feature of the Cape Colony's
countryside. They also penetrated into Xhosa territory, north to the
Tswana and the Ndebele and, after the Great Trek, into the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal.128 Often Dutch, and later, British young men
made a number of trips as smousen in the hope, often illusory, of
building up the capital they required for more permanent and settled
business. To do this, they began with funds borrowed from major Cape
Town or Graliamstown merchants.129
Trade across the frontier, both with the Xhosa in the east and with the
Griqua in the nordi, required substantially rnore regulation by the
colonial authorities than did the activities of the smousen within the
colony. Otherwise, the risks to the traders themselves, on the one hand,
and of the sale of firearms, on the other, were too great. In addition, the
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main source of red ochre, a substance of considerable ritual importance
within Xhosa society, was from 1820 within colonial territory, so that
many Xhosa would now enter the colony purely to acquire the clay. For
this reason, regulär fairs were set up, first at the clay pits in the Coombs
river valley to the east of Grahamstown and then, from 1824, weekly at
Fort Willshire on the Keiskamma. From 1819 annual fairs for Griqua
from the northern border were held at Beaufort West. In the beginning,
a wide spectrum of colonists traded at these fairs, but quickly the
business came to be concentrated in the hands of a small number of
professional traders.130
Within the colony itself, at least from the early nineteenth Century
onwards, the smousen had to compete with settled traders in the
increasing number of small towns. For example, in the 1790s, when John
Barrow visited Graaff-Reinet, he commented that virtually nothing
could be bought there.131 Nevertheless, by 1811 the Circuit Commission
reported that there were 25 tradesmen settled in Graaff-Reinet,132 and
two years later it reported that the local shopkeepers were complaining
that they had to pay a licence fee to trade while the 'country pedlars' were
exempt from such an exaction, an anomaly that was removed shortly
thereafter.133 By the 1830s, Graaff-Reinet had become a sizeable
commercial centre, visited by many farmers from further north who thus
were spared the annual trek to Cape Town.134
The development of the country towns ran parallel with the
establishment of larger merchant houses outside Cape Town. This, in
turn, was facilitated by the opening of the various bays from the Berg
river mouth to Port Elizabeth (as the settlement at Algoa Bay was named
in 1820).13S The pioneer in this coasting traffic was Frederik Korsten,
who in 1811 took on a contract to süpply Mauritius with salt meat from
Algoa Bay. His raw materials were cattle from the Zuurveld and other
eastern Cape regions and salt from the Uitenhage pans. From this base
hè was later able to diversify into sealing, whaling and, later, wool
farming.136 As an Eastern Province entrepreneur, hè was followed above
all by certain of the 1820 Settlers (ch. 10, pp. 472-74).137
The most significant example of the merchant penetration of the Cape
countryside was further west, in the commercial empire built up around
Swellendam by the firm of Barry and Nephews. Joseph Barry, the
senior partner, arrived in South Africa in 1819 and soon began in the
coasting trade. He was primarily responsible for opening up Port
Beaufort, at the mouth of the Breede River, as an outlet for the produce
(above all wheat and wool) of the Swellendam plains. This was a business
füll of risks, above all that of shipwreck, and Barry went bankrupt in 1827
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Nevertheless, hè was able to remain in business and two years later
cleared his debts. Thereafter in partnership with his two nephews, and
aided by the marriages into the Van Reenen family which all three of
them made, hè was able to engross a considerable proportion of the
business between Swellendam and Port Beaufort. In time the Barrys
were able to open ten stores from Worcester to Mossel Bay and at least
in this area to drive the smousen into insignificance.139
In 1835, the growth of Cape merchant houses was still in its early
stages. Nevertheless, the Barrys' success, along with those of other, less
prominent, merchants throughout the Cape, illustrates the steady
thickening of the Cape's commercial network_rhroughL .rhe early
nineteenth Century.
The world economy and the structure of Cape society
This chapter has so far been strictly concerned with economie, and where
possible measurable, matters. It has demonstrated that the colony's\^c, ;
incorporation in the world economie System resulted in a steady and, „ ^
cumulative increase in commodity production and exchange, both
during the Dutch and early British periods. Wine, wheat and livestock
prodïIcTiöTfrsïë"a'dily"incfêasë"d. Imports and, tó aTessër"ëxtënt, expöfts
expanded greatly. The Cape's monetary and credit Systems became at ^°" ,
 rf4 i V , ^
once less chaotic, more sophisticated and more closely tied to those ofJ "" p J
the imperial motherland. These interlocking economie processes, invv f , ^ t '
turn, shaped the social structure of the colony, not directly by fostering ... , , ^ ,- •
racial attitudes, but by aiding the establishment of structures of white - , , . v S
domination from which racial attitudes were, at least in part, derived and
forwhichtheywereusedasjustification. • ,. <\- < --
What were these social effects?.First, and most fundamentally, the very, ,' ƒ,*< .
existence of the colony and the Immigration to South Africa of two of the
major population groups, the white settlers and the slaves, was a direct..
 M ,
result of the world economy. Without the commercial requirements of •,
the Dutch East India Company the Cape would not have been colonised
in 1652; without its networks in the East, and without the slaving routes t i'- ' • • ' ' ' -
from East Africa and Madagascar to the New World, it would not have t - "' '
acquired the major component of its labour force; and without the needs
of the British imperial system it would not have changedcolonialmasters'^f,i'" n
around 1800. - • ' '
Secondly, it was their differing positions in die world economy which '
gave rise to the sharply divergent worlds of Cape Town and the "
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countryside, a contrast which would long endure. Cape Town was the
commercial and, increasingly, the financial centre of the colony, the seat
of government and by far the major port; it was thus the sluice through
which passed all the colony's contacts with the outside world. The wide
range of urban requirements brought into being a substantial skilied
artisanate, both free and slave. There were builders, carpenters, smiths,
tailors, dressmakers, and cobblers in addition to the small army of slaves
who fetched Cape Town's water, cut and hauled its firewood, disposed
of its rubbish and shifted its goods about.M0 The skilled slaves, unwilling
to submit to the strict discipline of manual labourers, frequently worked
on their own, paying their owners a fixed sum (known as koeliegeld) at
the end of the day or week, as did the slave retail traders. It was not
necessarily a humane system, but nevertheless it did give considerable
opportunity to the slaves, and encouraged the development of an urban
slave culture impossible elsewhere. Moreover, die multiplicity of
economie functions meant that contrasts of status between slave and free
were not necessarily absolute. Thus the employment opportunities of
Cape Town, its pre-emancipation slave culture and the relatively fluid
social structure of urban life - all indirectly products of Cape Town's
position in the world economie system - led to a relatively more open
society for brown and black people after the emancipation of the slaves
in the 1830s.
The contrast with the countryside is stark. There, the requirements of
wheat, wine and meat production led both to the atomisation of the
slave population on isolated farms and to the brutal exploitation of both
slaves and the Khoisan.141 The regulär needs of grain growing and wine
farming meant that slaves were continually driven, and were shifted from
one farm to another to cover the pealc periods of two sectors' production
cycles. Slaves were worked till they dropped, and if they survived but
were worn out, they were likely to be sold up-country as shepherds.142 In
general, the worse the economie conditions, the worse their treatment.
Moreover, there was always the danger that they would be flogged to
death for alleged misdemeanours.143
Thirdly, links between Cape agriculture and the world economy
enabled the Cape's merchant community to gain prominence. In the
eighteenth Century, of course, the merchants were the rulers, and at least
in Cape Town everyone traded in whatever commodity seemed likely to
offer the best profits. The British traditions of government were
somewhat different. An aristocrat like Lord Charles Somerset, son of the
Duke of Beaufort, Major-General in the British Army and, perhaps even
more significantly, ex-lieutenant-colonel of the highly prestigieus
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Coldstream Guards, would not have dreamed of trading openly.
Nevertheless the British government came to rely on the merchant elite
whose own links were with the City of London, together with die larger
landowners, particularly in die southwestern Cape. In the 1820s, for
example, the governor was ordered by the Colonial Office in London to
appoint a legislative council, whose vmofficial members were to be
chosen from 'the chief landed proprietors and principal merchants of the
colony5.144
Finally, the nature of economie contacts with Cape Town, and through
Cape Town with the rest of the world, did much to determine die course
of social developments on the frontier. In the early years of European
settlement, for instance in the Graaff-Reinet district, the brutality of
relations with die Khoikhoi rnay well have been die result of die district 's
comparatively weak links with the market. The farmers' desperate
attempts to create a cash income and a desirable life-style led diem to
acquire labour by the most vicious measures (ch. l, pp. 31--33). In the
first decades of the nineteenth Century, as commercial ties became firmer
and the district prospered, such excesses were no longer necessary or
tolerated.145 Commercial development, in turn, gave imperus to further •
expansion. Simultaneously, die Cape's incorporation into die British
empire finally provided a military force on the frontier sufficient to
ensure eventual European hegemony over the Xhosa (see ch. 10, pp.-
478-88). The rise in land values which preceded and followed die
mtroduction of merino sheep led not only to the demand lor territory
newly conquered from die Xhosa,146 but also for die extension of
colonial settlement into new areas, particularly north of the Orange.147
These varying social and geographical developments were, then,
products of the steady expansion and diversification of the Cape
Colony's economy. From the small beginnings of Van Riebeeck's post in
1652, diis economy had grown enormously, largely as a result of its
position within die world of the Dutch and, later, the British imperial
Systems. In comparison with the economies of other colonies and ex-
colonies, notably the United States of America, the Cape economy was
in all respects still puny. Nevertheless, it had laid die foundation upon
which South Africa would later build after the mining of diamonds and
gold began later in the nineteenth Century.
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